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Abstract
The article endeavours to link Aid for Trade (AfT) and Trade Facilitation (TF) 
conceptual and practical frameworks following a much celebrated trade deal 
among the WTO (World Trade Organization) members in its 9th Ministerial 
Conference in Bali, Indonesia (December 2013). As part of the deal, the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA) marked an escape from a more-than-a-decade long 
negotiated Doha Round. Currently being in the process of members’ ratification, 
TFA proffers a question on whether and how developing country members would 
fully commit and implement the agreement considering their behind-the-border 
lacking resources and technical capacity. The case of Indonesia in particular 
presents an illustration where the country’s serious logistical problems could fur-
ther limit its TF capacity building despite its AfT abundant programs and projects. 
The article is hence to assess the country’s logistics performance and its manage-
ment reform in an effort to integrate the existing AfT and TF frameworks in the 
wake of preparing the country to a wider context of TFA commitment and 
implementation.
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Background
 Indonesia offers a typical case in point where its ample Aid for Trade (AfT) 
commitments and disbursements do not necessarily end up in solid Trade 
Facilitation (TF) performance amidst its prolonged logistics complexities. The arti-
cle is an effort to elaborate the country’s logistics practices and how reform for its 
management would imply to the integration of the existing AfT and TF frameworks. 
The country’s AfT scheme, i.e. particularly at its policy formulation stage, needs to 
be linked to its TF practices due to its prone tendency for red tape bureaucracy and 
extortion. The article hence looks for linkages of the two schemes by zooming out 
conceivable integrated framework in the midst of contemporary Indonesian gov-
ernment initiatives to deal with the country’s rampant logistical management 
problems.
 Despite significantly increased commitments and disbursements since the 
launch of AfT initiative in 2005 and despite considerable concentration in its allo-
cation to infrastructure development-related sectors, Indonesia’s logistics practices 
–i.e. related particularly to ports and sea-lane shipments as well as rail and road 
ground delivery— continue to be underperformed. This leads to a question of 
whether the country’s logistics system (as a major component of its TF practices) is 
indeed in line with its AfT scheme. It leads to a query of whether recent TF 
Agreement (TFA) adoption, amidst its ratification and notification procedural 
complications, should be highlighted in light of acknowledging the need to integrate 
the country’s AfT and TF schemes.
 Governed under a specific government regulation on foreign aid procurement 
procedures, Indonesia’s foreign aid scheme (under which AfT is administered) 
poses a discrete process that spans from its commitments stage by donors, its allo-
cation, distribution, and finally actual disbursements stages (by varied-levels of 
governmental agencies). It is under such a long policy making process that the 
1. The article is originated from a research conducted in the framework of the WTO Chairs 
Programme (WCP) 2015 entitled “Indonesia’s Practices in Improving Logistics Performance and 
Competitiveness: Exploring Cases on ‘Aid for Trade’ Facilitation” (Annex 1-Research Report 2015 
WTO Chairs Programme Annual Report 2015, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia) in which the 
2nd author served as the lead researcher and was assisted by Ms. Vinie Puspaningrum and Ms. 
Nelly Cholida (to whom we would like to thank for their contribution in the early version of the 
report). While both authors conduct the analysis collaboratively, the 1st author is responsible for 
the final drafting of the paper.  The authors would like also to convey highest appreciation for 
valuable, detailed and constructive comments and suggestions offered by Professor Hideaki 
OHTA (of the Graduate School of International Relations) and the two anonymous reviewers (of 
the Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies) on the initial versions of the article. 
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country’s AfT scheme is to be discussed. The discussion utilizes an analytical 
framework that presumes the country’s adoption of TFA and its comprehensive 
road map towards TF step-by-step implementation would lead to improved perfor-
mance of the country’s logistics system, thus eventually its trade competitiveness. 
 
Questions to Address
 The following questions are thus raised in light of developing linkages of AfT 
and TF frameworks by comprehending the case of Indonesia’s logistics sector 
reform: 
 1.  In spite of rigorous attempt in linking AfT and TF at conceptual and prac-
tical levels, how does the case of Indonesia’s logistics sector reform offer il-
lustration of attempts to benefit from such an integrated framework that is 
aimed at enhancing trade competitiveness?
 2.  How has the country’s logistics system undergone management reform as it 
expects integrated AfT and TF frameworks? How do and should its existing 
AfT scheme need to be in line with its TF commitment?
 
Argument and Outline of the Article
 To address the questions, the following argument is proposed. Both at concep-
tual and practical levels, AfT and TF are mutually linked to support developing 
countries integration to the world trading system by providing variety of both 
technical assistance and other non-technical measures aiming mostly at easing 
barriers to trade. The current linkage, however, fails to acknowledge significance of 
the AfT/TF implementing stages, i.e. as it goes deeper into a recipient country’s 
AfT/TF policy formulation and its management. As one of major recipients of AfT 
and key proponents of TF, Indonesia offers a case in point for integrated AfT/TF 
frameworks in which:
 1.  The country’s current TF status maintains a prevalence of supply-side 
constraints and behind the border barriers to trade as indicated in its un-
derperformed logistics system;
 2.  Ineffective efforts to deal with such constraints and barriers –particularly 
in areas related to logistics management— are linked to the country’s AfT 
scheme that is incapable to keep up with the much needed reform;
 3.  The country’s logistics management reform is concerned and hence need 
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attention on:
a.  Coherent AfT and TF objectives and policy schemes;
b.  Solid coordinating mechanism among relevant governmental agencies 
in implementing those objectives and schemes;
c.  Redefined collaborative roles of leading governmental agencies respon-
sible for the AfT disbursement both at national/ministerial and regional/
local levels;
d.  Detailed TF arrangement to ensure accomplishment of the national 
single window initiative and national single gateway system aiming at 
easing export-import activities and other trade and investment 
facilitation;
e.  Shared common views among logistics stakeholders as government revi-
talizes the country’s logistics blueprint (National Logistics System/
SISLOGNAS).
 To systematically present the argument, the article is structured as follows. 
Section 1 (Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation) outlines conceptual and empirical 
integration of AfT and TF schemes. Section 2.1 (Indonesia’s Trade Facilitation 
Current Status), Section 2.2 (Indonesia’s Trade Facilitation and Logistics 
Performance) and Section 2.3 (Indonesia’s Logistics System) discuss respectively 
the country’s current status and progression in TFA, its TF practices and attain-
ment as it relates particularly to the country’s logistics system and performance. 
Section 3.1 (Indonesia’s Aid for Trade Scheme) and Section 3.2 (Features of 
Indonesia’s Aid for Trade) presents correspondingly the country’s AfT existing 
scheme, practices and features as seen from the country’s policy formulation and 
management schemes. Section 4 (Integrating Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation) 
attempts to assess integration of AfT and TF schemes referred to previously elabo-
rated case of the Indonesian logistics. The final section (Concluding Remarks) 
summarizes the article’s original intention as it draws lessons to be learnt.
 
1. Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation
 Aid for Trade (AfT)2 and Trade Facilitation (TF)3 linkages have continuously 
2. Launched at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 
(2005), AfT initiative main purpose is to assist developing countries to increase their trade volume 
by integrating into the global trade regime and adjusting their trade regulations. It is designed to 
support developing countries, LDCS in particular, to build their trade capacity and infrastructure 
in order for them to benefit from their engagement with global trade system. By February 2006, 
a task force was established with the aim to implement the AfT program focusing on identifying 
———————————————————
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been highlighted to reiterate fuller participation by developing countries in global 
trade (UNCTAD 2003, 2007, OECD 2013 and OECD-WTO 2015). The need to link 
AfT to TF is particularly great among developing and least developed countries 
(LDCs) alike as trade cost is still considerably high despite their intensified partic-
ipation in global trade. TF is needed to reduce trade costs which arise due to various 
barriers at the border, i.e. red tape bureaucracy, extortion and high taxes that 
should be paid by both exporters and importers which are commonplace among 
developing countries and LDCs (Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier 2007). 
 TF also plays an important role in improving exporters comparative advantage 
in many AfT recipient countries (Francois and Machin 2007). It is closely linked to 
the reduction of transport costs that hinders the trade flows efficiently upon which 
development of transportation infrastructure is one of priority AfT sectors. 
Additionally, TF is regarded as an act of reform to create a custom system that is 
more efficient and to combat corruption resulted bureaucratic uncertainty as it is 
expected to accelerate delivery waiting time aimed to lower trading costs for ex-
porters and importers (Basnett et al 2012).
 Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) AfT scheme, grants and conces-
sional loans (as part of overall ODA/Official Development Assistance) are targeted 
as trade-related programmes and projects (WTO 2006). They consist of technical 
assistance on trade related policy and regulations, trade related infrastructure aid 
and aid to develop productive capacity. In support form the WTO Secretariate, 
technical assistance and training programmes are aimed at officials and stakehold-
ers from developing countries. The main purpose of this trade capacity building is 
to enhance the capacity of developing countries to take full advantage of the 
rules-based multilateral trading system, to deal with new challenges and to enforce 
the needs of recipient countries and having a role as a bridge between donors and developing 
countries. A monitoring body was also established to undertake a periodic global review based on 
reports from a variety of stakeholders. 
3. TF is the only trade agenda (known as “the Singapore Issues” consisting of trade and invest-
ment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement and TF) that sur-
vived from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore (1996). While other agenda items were 
taken off the table after the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha (2001), TF was the only agenda 
that all WTO members agreed to negotiate further. After negotiations launched in 2004, it took 
almost 10 years for the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to be finally concluded. It was con-
cluded at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali (2013) as part of the Bali Package and has be-
come the first multilateral trade agreement signed since the establishment of the WTO in 1994. 
TFA main purpose is to ease customs procedures and facilitate the movement, release and clear-
ance of goods, thus by implementing TF bureaucracy is to be streamlined and corruption in cus-
toms procedures is to be minimized, and consequently it speeds up trade and lowers the cost of 
international trade.
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their rights and obligations.
 In this regards, foreign aid aiming specifically towards trade facilitation mea-
sures (known as the WTO Aid for Trade Facilitation/AfTF) has become a significant 
aspect of the AfT. The provision is hence a framework officially adopted by the 
WTO in linking AfT and TF at its policy level implementation. Under the frame-
work, AfT incorporates technical assistance for developing countries to develop 
their trade strategies, negotiate more effectively and implement the outcomes as 
well as improving their trade-related infrastructures.
 In spite of its major and significant roles in the initiation, formulation and 
application of AfT, the WTO only focuses on the formulation of trade rules oriented 
to the reduction of trade barriers. In more practical term, AfT is disbursed mostly 
bilaterally through donor countries or international, multilateral and regional fi-
nancial agencies to the recipient countries. Some other agencies are also involved 
in designing, implementing, evaluating and monitoring AfT programs and 
projects4. 
 In terms of measuring effectiveness of AfT, and hence to conceptually rational-
ize its linkage to TF practices and performance, various methodological prisms 
(including aggregate cross-country studies, program reviews and project evalua-
tion) are initiated in lights particularly of the global value chains (GVC) framework. 
The prisms are applied in order to capture the relationships of AfT and trade cre-
ation, update past empirical findings, push the cross-country analysis into new 
areas, look at impacts of different types of AfT on particular categories of developing 
countries, highlight the emerging role of value chains and work through the impli-
cations for AfT, and finally look at the roles of government management systems 
and how they interact with AfT donors (OECD-WTO 2013b).
 Echoing such an endeavor and by taking the Indonesian logistics case, the ar-
ticle is to foster AfT-TF linkages so as to comprehend how a particular government 
management system (administering and responsible for designing, implementing, 
evaluating and monitoring AfT programs) correlate to the attainment of its TF 
4. Apart from the WTO, key players of AfT include the World Bank, the African Development 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB), International Trade Centre (ITC), Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (UNESCAP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the 
World Customs Organization (WCO).
———————————————————
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practices and logistics system5. Priority areas in transport and logistics sectors that 
will remain key in AfT agenda are hard infrastructure (ports, airports, roads and 
rail links), soft infrastructure (transport regulations, customs and border procedure 
and private sector development), and collaboration and coordination among donor 
countries, trading partner countries and the private sectors (OECD-WTO 2013a).
 WTO AfTF (Aid for Trade Facilitation) scheme takes and designs TF policy 
measures, programs and projects in light of integrating existing foreign aid scheme 
into a wider trade and development context. It is thus essential to assess success 
and effectiveness of the AfTF scheme that is based on its impacts on “trade flows” 
(i.e. how TF measures enhance integration of developing countries into the trading 
system and global markets) and on “trade gains and economic growth” (i.e. how 
costly TF measures are if compared to its potential trade gains and other economic 
benefits) (Helble et al 2012). The article tracks AfT-TF linkages (as suggested in 
the existing WTO AfTF scheme) so as to elaborate the Indonesian logistics case.
 
2.1. Indonesia’s Trade Facilitation Current Status
 Following its decision to be part of the WTO TFA signatories (the Bali Package) 
resulted from the 2013 WTO Ministerial Conference, Indonesia’s TF state of play 
centers on its ratification and notification issues. On the first one, more than two 
years after the decision, the country has not yet ratified the document and hence 
sparked policy debates among decision makers and trade stakeholders whether the 
government has eventually to make a decision to ratify. Nevertheless, the issue is 
actually a little more complicated. Whether the country decides to ratify or not to 
ratify, the TFA Protocol of Amendment requires two-thirds6 of the WTO members 
5. In the area of TF as it relates to logistics performance, Desouza et al (2007) and Bahagia et 
al (2013) elaborate TF practices in the cases of ASEAN and Indonesian logistics respectively. 
Marc and Azhari (2007) additionally discuss cases in the Asian and the Pacific region highlighting 
the roles of public-private partnership scheme in implementing AfT. 
6. It means that it would require around 107 out of 161 WTO members to ratify the TFA (as of 
September WTO memberships). To date (as of 30 August 2016 with the newest members to ratify 
the agreement, i.e. Senegal and Uruguay), there are 92 members that have ratified the agreement, 
and it means there are less than 28 members to go for enforcing the agreement. The full list of 
those who have ratified is as follows: Hong Kong, China (8 December 2014), Singapore (8 January 
2015), United States of America (23 January 2015), Mauritius (5 March 2015), Malaysia (26 May 
2015), Japan (1 June 2015), Australia (8 June 2015), Botswana (18 June 2015), Trinidad and 
Tobago (29 July 2015), Korea (30 July 2015), Nicaragua (4 August 2015), Niger (6 August 2015), 
Chinese Taipei (17 August 2015), Belize (1 September 2015), Switzerland (2 September 2015), 
China (4 September 2015), Liechtenstein (18 September 2015), Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(29 September 2015), New Zealand (29 September 2015), Togo (1 October 2015), Thailand (5 
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to ratify and convey their acceptance to the WTO Secretariat in order for the 
agreement to come into force. 
 The TFA enforcement thus seems inevitable. Unless, Indonesia is able to influ-
ence other members not to ratify, the insertion TFA into the WTO Agreement is 
only a matter of time. With this in mind, to ratify or not to ratify is no longer the 
question. Once two-thirds of the members have ratified TFA will be automatically 
adopted, whether Indonesia ratifies it or not. Against such a background, the article 
suggests that it is far more appropriate to raise questions on what should the 
country do to prepare itself? What efforts should be made to take advantage of any 
opportunities following adoption of TFA? Because, by the time the agreement 
comes into force, the country has to face with the second issue, the tougher one, i.e. 
to provide notification of commitment categories for the TFA provisions. 
 As previously mentioned, TFA main purpose is to ease customs procedures and 
facilitate the movement, release and clearance of goods. It is expected to cut bu-
reaucracy and corruption in customs procedures and consequently speed up trade 
and lower the cost of international trade. The first section of the agreement contains 
approximately 40 technical measures that the government is required to implement 
in order to reduce trade costs. These comprise a series of measures for the prompt 
and efficient movement of goods across borders. Under such provisions, each 
member is obliged to publish all information regarding procedures, regulations, 
fees and charges, penalties and any other necessary information.  All information 
should be available on the Internet, along with enquiry points that should be made 
available. Furthermore, the TFA also obliges members to issue an advance ruling, 
provide procedures for appeal or review, ensure border agency cooperation and 
provide a guarantee for freedom of transit, among other things (OECD-WTO 2015: 
October 2015), European Union and its Member states (5 October 2015), Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (19 October 2015), Pakistan (27 October 2015), Panama (17 
November 2015), Guyana (30 November 2015), Côte d’Ivoire (8 December 2015), Grenada (8 
December 2015), Saint Lucia (8 December 2015), Kenya (10 December 2015), Viet Nam  (15 
December 2015), Brunei Darussalam (15 December 2015), Norway (16 December 2015), Ukraine 
(16 December 2015), Zambia  (16 December 2015), Myanmar  (16 December 2015), Lesotho (4 
January 2016), Georgia (4 January 2016), Seychelles (11 January 2016), Jamaica (19 January 
2016), Mali (20 January 2016), Cambodia (12 February 2016), Paraguay (1 March 2016), Turkey 
(16 March 2016), Brazil (29 March 2016), Macao, China (11 April 2016), United Arab Emirates (18 
April 2016), Samoa (21 April 2016), India (22 April 2016), Russian Federation (22 April 2016), 
Montenegro (10 May 2016), Albania (10 May 2016), Sri Lanka (31 May 2016), Saint Kitts and 
Nevis (17 June 2016), Madagascar (20 June 2016), Republic of Moldova (24 June 2016), El 
Salvador (4 July 2016), Honduras (14 July 2016), Mexico (26 July 2016), Peru (27 July 2016), 
Saudi Arabia (28 July 2016), Afghanistan (29 July 2016), Senegal (24 August 2016), Uruguay (30 
August 2016).
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Chapter 4).
 In addition to the obligations embedded in the agreement, it should be noted 
that TFA is the only WTO trade agreement that extends comprehensive and special 
provisions regarding developing countries and least developed countries (Section 2) 
that uniquely allows them to implement the Agreement based on their own assess-
ment.  In this regard, each developing country and LDC may determine when it 
will implement and identify whether it will need any technical assistance and 
support for capacity building to implement the measures7.  As part of the obliga-
tions, on July 31 2014, Indonesia notified the Preparatory Committee on Trade 
Facilitation that three provisions could be categorized into Category A, i.e. provi-
sions on penalty disciplines, pre-arrival processing, and the use of Customs 
Brokers.
 
2.2. Indonesia’s Trade Facilitation and Logistics Performance
 Beyond its last notification of commitment categories (July 31 2014) and not-
withstanding of the Indonesian government efforts to disseminate the TFA provi-
sions, to date (as of May 2016), less concerted measures are taken by relevant trade 
stakeholders in the country in terms of preparation for TFA full implementation 
and how they are detailing and scoping notification procedures. In the midst of 
such inaudible situation with regards to Indonesia’s current status over TFA, the 
country’s TF performance –including essentially in the logistics-related sectors— is 
to be questioned for its discontented feature and lack of bold improvement 
measures. 
 Based on Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFI) that comprises 11 indicators/
areas8 referring to TFA provisions (OECD 2015), overall Indonesia’s TFI 
7. TFA sets out three different categories of notifications. Category A provisions mean that the 
member is able to implement when the Agreement comes into force. Category B provisions mean 
that the member is able to implement the Agreement after a transitional period following it 
coming into effect.  Category C provisions allow a nation to not only implement the agreement’ 
requirements after a transitional period as in Category B, but also provides that nation with as-
sistance and capacity building support. To assist with reaching these goals, the WTO members 
also created the Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility (TFAF) in 2014 as a supporting body and 
a focal point to assist developing countries and least developed countries in dealing with their 
TFA obligations. 
8. The areas/indicators are (1) Information Availability (publication of trade information, in-
cluding on Internet); (2) Involvement of the Trade Community (consultations with traders); (3) 
Advance Rulings (prior statements by the administration to requesting traders concerning the 
classification, origin, valuation method, etc., applied to specific goods at the time of importation; 
the rules and process applied to such statements; (4) Appeal Procedures (the possibility and 
———————————————————
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performance continues to be below best performance. The country however matches 
best performance across the sample as regards information availability and fees 
and charges as it also exceeds the average performance of lower middle-income 
countries in all TFI areas apart from internal border agency cooperation. Its perfor-
mance nevertheless has improved between 2013 and 2015 in all TFI areas apart 
from the simplification and harmonization of documents and internal border 
agency cooperation. Its performance in the area of simplification and harmoniza-
tion of documents is stable, while on internal border agency cooperation some 
ground was lost (see the following Diagram 1: Indonesia’s TFI Performance).
Diagram 1: Indonesia’s TFI Performance
Source: Trade Facilitation Indicators Country Note Indonesia (OECD, 2015)
 If measured under global competitiveness index (GCI), Indonesia ranks at 34 
out of 144 (WEF 2014-5). Several major ASEAN economies rank higher, i.e. 
Thailand (31), Malaysia (20) and Singapore (2), while others, i.e. the Philippines, 
modalities to appeal administrative decisions by border agencies); (5) Fees and Charges (disci-
plines on the fees and charges imposed on imports and exports0; (6) Formalities – Documents 
(acceptance of copies, simplification of trade documents; harmonization in accordance with inter-
national standards; (7) Formalities – Automation (electronic exchange of data; use of risk man-
agement; automated border procedures; (8) Formalities – Procedures (streamlining of border 
controls; single submission points for all required documentation (single windows); post-clearance 
audits; authorized economic operators); (9) Internal Cooperation (control delegation to customs 
authorities; cooperation between various border agencies of the country); (10) External Co-
operation Cooperation with neighboring and third countries; (11) Governance and Impartiality 
(customs structures and functions; accountability; ethics policy).
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Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar rank lower at 52, 68, 93, 95 and 134 re-
spectively. Against the BRICS, Indonesia is well above that of India (71), Brazil 
(57), South Africa (56) and Russia (53), but quite far behind that of China (28). In 
the past 5 years, the country’s performance is in steady improvement (38 (of 148) 
in 2013-4, 50 (of 144) in 2012-3, and 46 (of 142) in 2011-2). With 4 (four) notches up 
to 34, the country’s overall GCI performance continues to progress, including those 
of infrastructure and connectivity pillar. Up 5 (five) places from past year (2013-4) 
and 20 (twenty) places since 2011, Indonesia ranks 56th in related GCI pillar (see 
the following Table 1: Global Competitiveness Index of ASEAN and BRICS 
Countries)
Table 1: Global Competitiveness Index of ASEAN and BRICS Countries
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014
 In comparison to other market economies, Indonesia logistics performance in-
dex (LPI) sits at 53 among 150 countries surveyed (World Bank 2014). Against the 
BRICS, the country is comparable that of India (54) and way ahead of Brazil (65) 
and Russia (90), but far behind South Africa (34) and China (28). Among the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) major economies, Indonesia 
overtook the Philippines (57) but fell behind Vietnam (48), Thailand (35), Malaysia 
(25) and Singapore (5). In 2007, the country ranked at 43 (of 150), then 75 (of 155) 
in 2010 and 59 (of 155) in 2012. Such fluctuated and unstable performance indicates 
the complexity of logistics issues to be addressed in this archipelagic country.
 As indicated in its volatile LPI performance, Indonesia requires a much im-
proved logistics capabilities –despite solid improvement in infrastructure and con-
nectivity and overall GCI rank. It is particularly the case for ports (sea-lane 
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shipments) as well as rail and road (ground delivery). As an archipelagic country, 
Indonesia is urged to have adequate main port(s) as a hub of international trade. 
The country has a few numbers of ports that have the capability to handle interna-
tional shipment and trade flow from the small ports, and they need to be upgraded 
to international ports. Around 94% of international freight shipments are served at 
5 (five) main ports, i.e. Tanjung Priok port of Jakarta, Tanjung Perak port of 
Surabaya, Belawan port of Medan, Tanjung Emas port of Semarang and Soekarno-
Hatta port of Makassar (OECD 2012). 
 At the same time, contribution of domestic freight shipments in those five 
ports has shown a very high number, nearly 85% (OECD 2012). Dense frequency of 
delivery of goods, which are concentrated in those five ports, may contribute to 
cause the worsening dwelling time. Accumulation of goods and delivery schedules 
setback further complicates the problem that eventually leads to inefficiency. The 
port of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta itself has a fairly low productivity when compared 
to ports in Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand (Ministry of Transportation 2012). Indonesia’s 2014-5 GCI pillar on infra-
structure represents the complexity where the quality of port infrastructure –ranks 
at 77th— in particular has placed the country far behind its closest competitor 
economies, such as Thailand (54), China (53) and South Africa (46). The country’s 
port quality is simply not to be compared with that of Malaysia (19) and Singapore 
Diagram 2: Indonesia Overall LPI (2007-2014)
Source: World Bank 2014
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Customs
Infrastructure
International Shipment
Logistics Competence
Tracking and Tracing
Timeliness
Customs Infrastructure InternationalShipment
Logistics
Competence
Tracking and
Tracing Timeliness
2014 2.87 2.92 2.87 3.21 3.11 3.53
2012 2.53 2.54 2.97 2.85 3.12 3.61
2010 2.43 2.54 2.82 2.47 2.77 3.46
2007 2.73 2.83 3.05 2.9 3.3 3.28
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(2), and is only comparable to that of India (76) and Russia (81). 
 During the past decade, overall Indonesia’s logistics performance9 resembles 
complexities and the need of how to better manage its customs and logistics infra-
structure. As shown in the following Diagram 2 Indonesia Overall LPI (2007-2014), 
despite its sound performance in international shipment, logistics competence, 
tracking and tracing ability, and timeliness (by having scores of >3 in average 
during 2007-2014), the LPI scores on customs and logistics infrastructure are aver-
agely low during the entire same period. Continuingly to score <3, the two sub-in-
dicators reflect basic problems faced by the country’s logistics system, i.e. to embrace 
soft and hard infrastructures alike10 (see Diagram 2 above).
 
2.3. Indonesia’s Logistics System
 Confronting with such complexities, Indonesian authority and its logistics 
stakeholders have managed to agree in a common platform identifying strategic 
issues, steps and roadmap to move forward. The platform –which is codified in the 
Blueprint on National Logistics System or SISLOGNAS (stands for Sistem Logistik 
Nasional in Bahasa Indonesia) under Presidential Regulation No. 26 (March 
2012)— is a major reference in outlining key commodities, roles of logistics players 
and logistics service providers, status and development of transport and ICT infra-
structure, human resource management, relevant laws and regulations, and its 
9. Logistics Performance Index (LPI) (World Bank/WB, 2014) offers 6 sub-indicators and de-
fines: (1) customs as efficiency of the clearance process (i.e. speed, simplicity and predictability of 
formalities) by border control agencies, including customs; (2) logistics infrastructure as qual-
ity of trade and transport related infrastructure (e.g. ports, railroads, roads and information 
technology); (3) international shipment as ease of arranging competitively priced shipments; 
(4) logistics competence as competence and quality of logistics services (e.g. transport opera-
tors, customs brokers); (5) tracking and tracing as ability to track and trace consignments; and 
(6) timeliness as timeliness of shipments in reaching destinations within the scheduled and ex-
pected delivery time.
10. Soft logistical matters include national logistics system and transport sector regulation 
along with customs and border procedure as they would impact on delays and uncertainty faced 
by traders (WTO/OECD, 2013). Hard logistical infrastructure problems on ports, roads, railroads 
and information technology are certainly much more damaging as trade impediments is now 
originated not only from tariffs, other non-tariff barriers, but also from changes in the nature of 
supply-chains management and production network that are more and more flexible and frag-
mented horizontally, spatially. The latter phenomenon requires: (1) functioning hard logistics 
infrastructure and accelerating infrastructure investment that should be combined with a solid 
soft logistics governance reform (Jacobs 2012; Blyde 2012); (2) quality of hard logistics infrastruc-
ture, particularly its transport-related one, that relates specifically to the development and ad-
vancement of relevant information communication and technology (ICT) (Limao and Venables 
2002; Clark, Dollar and Micco 2004; and Baldwin 2011).
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institutional schemes (SLI 2013). 
 SISLOGNAS maintains that the country logistics system is divided into 3 
(three) categories based on its key commodities: (1) primary and strategic commod-
ity; (2) export oriented product; (3) general product. It further asserts that the 
second product category is aimed to enhance Indonesia’s competitiveness that 
hence needs government supports in trade facilitation to improve infrastructure 
and export quantity. 
 The following Diagram 3: SISLOGNAS Assessment (2011-2015) outlines as-
sessment of major conditions, requirements and schemes needed in order to deal 
with the complexities faced by Indonesia’s logistics stakeholders. Aside from its 
institutional scheme under SISLOGNAS, utilization of relevant foreign aid or 
grant to improve the country’s logistics performance has also been persistently 
endeavored, especially in terms of channeling infrastructure investment projects 
and programs to ease the country’s logistics problems. As previously stated, the 
Diagram 3: SISLOGNAS Assessment (2011-2015)
Source: SLI 2013
Key Commodities
#1 Category: Need for
Regional Distribution
Centers for Basic and
Strategic Commodities
#2 Category: Revitalized
and developed export
commodity supply chain
networks
#3 Category: Improved
eﬀectiveness of dry
ports’ operations
Logistics Players (LPs) and
Service Providers (LSPs)
Reliable and competitive
LPs and LSPs, incl. small
and medium enterprise
(SMEs) and cooperatives
Increased roles of
logistics state owned
enterprises (SOEs) (e.g.
PT Pos Indonesia, Bulog)
Revitalized commercial
SOEs serving as trading
house for basic/strategic
and export commodities
Supporting Systems
Transport Infrastructure:
intl. hub seaports,
airports, scheduled short
sea shipping (SSS)
ICT Infrastructure:
National e-logistics
system (INALOG)
Human resource mngmt.
synchronized laws &
regulations, initiation of
SISLOGNAS task force
91
Towards an Integrated Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation Framework: Logistics Management Reform in Indonesia
article is hence an effort to reiterate how such an endeavor is perceived and even-
tually formulated by the country’s policy makers who deal with, first of all, aid and 
grant management and, secondly, logistics-related technicalities.
 Practices of SISLOGNAS, however, are hampered by lack of achievement in 
the targets and goals set in its previous assessment scheme of 2011-2015. Those 
missing targets are particularly worth to be noted in the case of logistics supporting 
systems for sea-lane transport modes and international hub seaports. Under the 
previous SISLOGNAS assessment, the systems are to be relied on the development 
of national sea-lane LPs/LSPs and SSS (scheduled short sea-shipping) by limiting 
the movement of international sea-lane LPs/LSPs, i.e. by assigning two major 
seaports as the only international hub for the latter type of LPs/LSPs, i.e. Kuala 
Tanjung and Bitung as western and eastern most sea ports respectively. The new 
scheme of “Tol Laut”11 introduced by the new government under President Joko 
Widodo would conversely be detrimental to the previous SISLOGNAS assessment 
as it would rely more on the presence of shipping armada with much larger tonnage 
than the existing ones –regardless they are of national or international origins. 
 
3.1. Indonesia’s Aid for Trade Scheme
 Similar to the case of many other middle-income countries, Indonesia’s Aid for 
Trade (AfT) scheme takes a specific form of ODA which is part of foreign aid com-
prising foreign loan and grant. Procurement procedure for both types of foreign aid 
is regulated under the Indonesian Government Regulation No. 10 (2011) (IGR 10-
2011) entitled “Procurement Procedures for Foreign Loan and Grant Acceptance.” 
Accordingly, it should be used as the guidelines for the ministries and other insti-
tutions in dealing with foreign loan and grant.
 Foreign loan requires stricter rules than that of foreign grant. It is the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) who has the authority to perform the loan agreement, acting as 
representative of the Indonesian government. As stipulated in Article 3 of IGR 
10-2011, the MoF has the authority to perform foreign loan and accept grant source 
from outside and inside the country. Further it is being emphasized in the next 
article, Article 4, that other ministries/institutions, regional government and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are prohibited to perform any kind of agreement that 
will raise the obligation such as foreign loan. Any kind of aid for trade in the form 
11. Literally means “Sea Toll” (in parallel to that of Toll Road), the scheme is introduced by the 
President himself in his effort to connect all the country’s existing major seaports to further ease 
sea-lane movement of goods and other logistical barriers in sea transportation.
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of loan will have to be registered by the MoF. Therefore, administratively the MoF 
should have all the relevant data and information regarding this form of aid. 
 Grant on the other hand follows the same rule, yet less strict. There are two 
types of grant according to the way it is disbursed, planned grant and direct grant. 
The State Ministry of National Development Planning (also known as BAPPENAS 
- stands for Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional in Bahasa Indonesia) is 
in charge of drafting medium and yearly activity plan, which will be funded from 
the grant. It is important to note that Indonesian planning system is different from 
a typical central planning model where the core planning function is located within 
the jurisdiction of the budget office (MoF). The Indonesian system puts this func-
tion within BAPPENAS jurisdiction.
 However, both BAPPENAS and MoF share responsibility in managing the aid. 
In the case of a direct grant, before the conclusion of grant agreement, ministries/
institutions shall consult on the planning with MoF, BAPPENAS and other related 
ministers/institutions. Evaluation mechanism applicable for both foreign loan and 
grant is through a quarterly report submitted to the MoF and BAPPENAS. The 
report consists of information regarding the implementation of goods/services pro-
curement, its progress, fund’s realization, problems occurred during implementa-
tion and any follow up activity. 
 Although it has been regulated explicitly in IGR 10-2011 that ministries/insti-
tutions, regional government and SOEs are obliged to submit quarterly report re-
garding the grant that they have received, in practice this does not occur. As ex-
plained in more detail below, BAPPENAS confirms that they do not have a good 
procedure and mechanism in evaluating grants implementation. BAPPENAS just 
started to create a database and standard operating procedure to administer aid in 
the form of grant. BAPPENAS eventually asserts that donor agencies conversely 
have a better mechanism and procedure of monitoring and evaluation. 
 Yet the mechanism for aid distributions is carefully selected by BAPPENAS. 
Directorate of Development Planning is one of the divisions in BAPPENAS that 
has various partnerships with some other ministries. The directorate does not 
govern all incoming flows of aid for trade. Their authority has been only focusing 
over foreign aid flows into governmental bodies. The directorate governs national 
development plan with funds originating from both local and foreign donors which 
might be either grants or loans scheme. IGR 10-2011 stipulates that each govern-
mental body has the authority to manage the scheme independently but should 
report to BAPPENAS. 
 BAPPENAS also controls the flow of grants and loan, which both are treated 
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differently due to their distinct idea and characteristics. Grants –categorized under 
“direct” and “planned” grants— are more flexible, short term, and could be dis-
bursed in the middle of fiscal year. Conversely, loans are long term and more 
structurally planned. The flow of information of grant or foreign loan is published 
from the Ministry of Finance at least once every six month. The mechanism of 
grant selection is as follows: donors origins, purpose, following warranty, and it 
relations to Medium Term National Developmental Plan (also known as RPJMN-
stands for Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional in Bahasa 
Indonesia). 
 The direct grant is less complex than planned grant. The direct grant is only 
interacting with BAPPENAS and the chosen ministry. Meanwhile, the planned 
grant mechanism is as follows. Following the donor’s final decision, BAPPENAS 
coordinates with the MoF to establish a “grant agreement” which then to be for-
warded to the related ministry that already includes in BAPPENAS plan. IGR 10-
2011 Article 57 specifies that grant could be forwarded or lend to local government 
and/or SOEs. It has then to be recorded in national state budget (also known as 
APBN - stands for Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara in Bahasa Indonesia) 
in the case of SOEs, or regional/local government budget (also known as APBD - 
stands for Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah in Bahasa Indonesia) in the 
case of local/regional governments as grant recipients.
 The succeeding Diagram 4: Indonesia’s Grant Categories and Selection 
Mechanism offers elaborate diagrammatic description:
 BAPPENAS recaps that Indonesian government has not yet developed a single 
database that records grant or loan transactions, including specifically with re-
gards to infrastructure and other logistics-related supporting schemes from the aid 
recipients. This is a crucial issue as more and more private sectors participate in 
infrastructure development projects. Based on the medium term national develop-
ment plan (RPJMN) and also the long term national development plan (RPJP - 
stands for Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang in Bahasa Indonesia), infra-
structure is the key project that needs to collaborate with private sectors. Indonesia 
has the Public Private Partnership (PPP) scheme (also known as KPS - stands for 
Kemitraan Pemerintah-Swasta in Bahasa Indonesia) which proportionally defines 
the roles of government and private sectors12. Even though the biggest funding 
12. Introduction of PPP scheme in infrastructure investment dates back to 1998 when the 
Government of Indonesia promulgated Presidential Decree No. 7/1998 on cooperation between 
government and business entity in development or management of infrastructure. The regulatory 
framework (which was updated/amended in 2005, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2015) serves as the basic 
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came from private sectors, the Indonesian government plays crucial role to decide 
which project(s) is or are to be taken. 
 
3.2. Features of Indonesia’s Aid for Trade
 The following Diagram 5: Indonesia’s Aid for Trade (AfT) Commitment (2007-
2012) and Diagram 6: Indonesia’s AfT Disbursement (2007-2012) feature respec-
tively donors’ commitment and Indonesian government efforts to allocate and dis-
burse AfT. Discrepancy between the commitment made and actual AfT allocation/
disbursement is quite apparent reaffirming –as previously indicated— the 
Diagram 4: Indonesia’s Grant Categories and Selection Mechanism
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Ministries)
Ministerial/Regio
nal/SOEs
Planned
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Finance
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reference for infrastructure development in the country under PPP scheme. The PPP projects are 
selected based on its levels of readiness: (1) Potential Projects; (2) Prospective Projects; and (3) 
Ready to Offer Projects. The categorization reflects differences in the treatment, terms and condi-
tions of each PPP project. The overall process and procedures of the selection and assessment of a 
proposed project are administered under BAPPENAS Directorate of Government-Private 
Cooperation or in Bahasa Indonesia, Direktorat Pengembangan Kerjasama Pemerintah-Swatsa 
(PKPS). The directorate is therefore responsible in coordinating with relevant ministries, region-
al/local governments or SOEs in defining terms and condition of a PPP infrastructure project, 
including in determining the types of funding of the project incurred, i.e. via mixed loan, full grant 
or private investment. (see: BAPPENAS. 2015. PPP Infrastructure Project Plans in Indonesia 
2015).
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complexity of the country’s discreet mechanism in AfT-related planning and imple-
mentation which spans across different (horizontal) ministerial agencies and varied 
levels of (vertical) governmental agencies.  This has lead to recurrent changes in 
policy and sectoral priorities. AfT actual allocation and disbursement for road 
transport have been much larger than its committed values for almost the entire 
period of 2007-2012 (except in 2007). Whereas AfT actual allocation and disburse-
ment for rail transport have been smaller than its committed values (2007-2012).
 As shown in Diagram 5, in terms of commitment, areas considered to be the 
focus of the country’s AfT scheme are infrastructure sector (especially in rail and 
road transport) and transport policy and administrative management. The largest 
aid committed by the donors flows into infrastructure sector, i.e. to include road 
and railway transportation networks. These two infrastructure sectors are the 
backbone of the country’s logistics. Since most of industries are located on the is-
land of Java, both sectors play a vital role to ease trade flows from main industrial 
area to both domestic and global market. Inversely, air and water transportation 
receive fewer foreign aid funds if compare to land transportations.
 Transport policy and administrative management is the second largest sector 
of foreign aid committed by the donors, i.e. 21% (as compare to rail transport which 
got 44% share) of the total AfT commitment in 2007-2012 period. Transport policy 
and administrative management is part of reform in soft infrastructure that plays 
significant role in customs clearance and trade regulation issues. The reform is 
aimed at reducing perception on notorious Indonesia’s red tape bureaucracy result-
ed from unsound policy and administrative management. 
 While technical assistance is offered in order to create a conducive and inves-
tor-friendly policy, donors have been committed also to provide foreign funds bilat-
erally or multilaterally making most of foreign aid committed into trade policy, 
trade facilitation and communication policy sectors. See Diagram 5 especially for 
commitment made to trade facilitation in 2008, communications policy in 2009, and 
trade policy in 2010. However, as shown in Diagram 6, in terms of disbursement, 
trade policy sector has much bigger allocation than the one for trade facilitation 
and communications policy. In 2012, trade policy is the 5th largest sectors to receive 
actual allocation of AfT trailing behind that of transport policy, water transport, 
rail transport and road transport (which is also the largest actual AfT receiving 
sector for the entire period is road sector). See Diagram 6 for the details. 
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Diagram 5: Indonesia’s AfT Commitment (2007-2012)
Source: OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS) (accessed as of March 
9 2016, available online at: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids)
Diagram 6: Indonesia’s AfT Disbursement (2007-2012)
Source: OECD QWIDS 2016 (accessed as of March 9 2016, available online at: http://stats.oecd.org/
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 It is also apparent that in the period of 2007-2012, Indonesian government 
emphasized more on land transport rather than other modes of transport. As the 
next Diagram 7: Total Allocated Indonesia’s AfT Commitment (2007-2012) exhibit-
ed, AfT commitment for rail transport during the period reached the total of US $ 
764.6 millions or 44% of the overall AfT commitment. At the same period, road 
transport sector got a total of US $ 211.06 millions or 12% of the overall AfT com-
mitment. AfT commitment for transport policy and administrative management 
which is mostly allocated for land transport reached the total amount of US $ 
362.36 millions or 21% of the overall AfT commitment during the same period.
 Most of the logistics gridlock was, however, found in delivering industrial 
products to outer and remote islands outside Java. This has been pointed out as the 
trigger of price gaps between Java and other islands in Indonesia which in turn 
cause the country unable catching up its neighboring countries in order to achieve 
a highly economic competitiveness. AfT scheme is therefore suggested to delivering 
aid towards more needed sectors, such as assisting Indonesian government to build 
extensive and high quality air and water transportation. As Diagram 7 also shown, 
water transport got only a 5% share of the total AfT commitment in the period of 
2007-2012 (valued US $ 93.545 millions). 
 Sector with least foreign aid committed is ICT (Information and communica-
tion technology) that is believed to be a contributing factor to drive logistics system 
more efficiently and providing fast and reliable service for both exporters and im-
porters13. The sector got a mere 1% share of the total AfT commitment in 2007-2012 
which is valued as small as US $ 19.952 millions (see Diagram 7). Other sector di-
rectly linked to ICT is telecommunications which also had a very small share (less 
then 1% and valued only US $ 4 millions of the total AfT commitment in 
2007-2012.
 National single window (NSW) is one of ICT-related trade facilitation initiative 
that enables international (cross-border) traders to submit regulatory documents 
at a single location and/or single entity. Typical documents to be covered and han-
dled under the NSW initiative are customs declarations, applications for import/
export permits, and other supporting documents such as certificates of origin and 
trading invoices. ICT development is mandatory for the national government and 
several stakeholders (including foreign stakeholders and parties) in managing 
13. Modernization of ICT aiming to help human resources to do their duty well and to deliver 
good services for customers is closely related to custom clearances process. ICT is therefore seri-
ously needed to integrate all requirements and regulations from participating ministries in cus-
toms and logistics-related matters.
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trade issue which hinders trade flows in the country.
 As previously indicated, Diagram 8 shows that land transportation holds the 
largest amounts of aid disbursal in the period of 2007-2012. However, AfT dis-
bursement for water transportation sector is substantially greater than its commit-
ment in the overall period of 2007-2012. As Diagram 8 Total Allocations of 
Indonesia's AfT Disbursement (2007-2012) exhibited, AfT disbursement for water 
transport sector reach the total value of US $ 253.24 millions or 18% of the AfT 
funds disbursed during the overall period of 2007-2012. AfT commitment for water 
transport is only 5% of overall AfT commitment for the period of 2007-2012 (see 
Diagram 6). However, as Diagram 7 also revealed, total AfT disbursement of road 
transport is much larger than its total commitment during the same period, i.e. 
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35% disbursed as compare to 12% committed.
 Water transport sector has eventually been rampant with severe problems 
which lead to underperformed logistics system. Port bottleneck and longer dwelling 
time (if compared to ports in neighboring countries) is a warning sign for logistics 
stakeholders in the country. It is a strong indication that increased trade volume 
has not been followed by capable physical infrastructure, especially that of port. 
Economic losses triggered by port gridlock are quite enormous, and it is being 
worsened by lack of good shipping services as the basic requirement for the country 
sea logistics system given its archipelagic nature that is prone to sustained 
changing weather condition14. 
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14. Ambitious agenda by the current government to establish self-sufficient shipping services 
(the so-called “tol laut” or “shipping toll-lane”) would aspire not to rely too much on foreign provid-
ers. If the government is able to provide good quality shipping services, it will overcome the trade 
issue at the port. But if not, it would certainly hurdle Indonesia’s economic sustainability in the 
future.
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4. Integrating Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation Linkages 
 Based on the previous elaboration on the country’s logistics case, along with its 
TF and AfT current state of play and status, the ensuing Table 2 Integrated 
Indonesia AfT-TF Framework recaps main points to be taken in an attempt to ap-
ply AfT-TF integrated framework into the country’s logistics case. 
Table 2: Integrated Indonesia AfT-TF Framework
T
F
 -
 T
ra
d
e 
F
ac
il
it
at
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n
S
ta
te
 o
f 
P
la
y On TF Agreement
• Not ratified (as of May 2016): the 
country may have to accept TFA 
enforcement in the near future 
looking at the latest numbers (79) 
of members ratified the 
agreement
• Notification: Category A (on pen-
alty disciplines, pre-arrival pro-
cessing, and the use of Customs 
Brokers) (as of July 31 2014)
• Little concerted measures taken 
by trade stakeholders in prepara-
tion for TFA enforcement and its 
full implementation (as of May 
2016)
A
fT
 -
 A
id
 f
or
 T
ra
d
e
S
ch
em
e • Nature: ODA/foreign aid (loan & 
grant)
• Procurement procedure: regulat-
ed under the Indonesian 
Government Regulation No. 10 
(2011) (IGR 10-2011) “Procure-
ment Procedures for Foreign 
Loan and Grant Acceptance.”
• IGR 10-2011 as guidelines for the 
ministries and other institutions 
for AfT/ODA/foreign aid (loan and 
grant) procurement
• Key agencies: Ministry of 
Finance, the State Ministry of 
National Development Planning 
(BAPPENAS)
G
en
er
al
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce On OECD TF Indicators (2015)
• Overall performance: below best
• Best-match areas: information 
availability and fees and charges
• Except on the area of internal 
border agency cooperation, over-
all performance exceeds average 
performance of lower middle-in-
come countries in all other areas
• Except on the areas of simplifica-
tion and harmonization of docu-
ments and internal border agency 
cooperation, overall performance 
nevertheless has improved be-
tween 2013 and 2015 in all other 
areas
F
ea
tu
re
s On AfT commitment (2007-12)
• Focused areas: infrastructure 
and trade policy and administra-
tive management
• Most committed: infrastructure 
sector (road and railway trans-
portation networks as the back-
bone of the country’s logistics), 
with lesser commitment made for 
air and water transportation
• Least committed: ICT sector
On AfT disbursement (2007-12)
• Focused areas: more on land 
transport rather than other 
modes of transport
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• Stagnated area: simplification 
and harmonization of documents
• Loosing ground area: internal 
border agency cooperation (i.e. 
need to improve the cooperation 
on the ground between various 
administrations present at the 
border)
• Most disbursed: road and rail 
transport, (however disburse-
ment for water transportation 
sector is substantially greater 
than its commitment)
• Least disbursed: trade-related 
adjustment sector
S
pe
ci
fi
c 
A
sp
ec
t 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce On WEF GCI (2014-15)
• Overall rank: 34 (out of 144)
• Comparison to ASEAN countries
• Higher: Thailand (31), Malaysia 
(20) and Singapore (2)
• Lower: the Philippines (52), 
Vietnam (68), Laos (93), 
Cambodia (95) and Myanmar 
(134)
• Comparison to the BRICS
• Higher: China (28)
• Lower: India (71), Brazil (57), 
South Africa (56) and Russia 
(53)
• Past 5 years performance: 4 (four) 
notches up to 34, steady improve-
ment (38 (of 148) in 2013-4, 50 (of 
144) in 2012-3, and 46 (of 142) in 
2011-2)
• Infrastructure and connectivity 
pillar: 56 (up 5 (five) places from 
past year (2013-4) and 20 (twen-
ty) places since 2011)
On World Bank LPI (2014)
• Overall performance: 53 (out of 
150)
• Comparison to the BRICS
• Lower: India (54) and way 
ahead of Brazil (65) and Russia 
(90)
• Higher: South Africa (34) & 
China (28)
• Comparison to major ASEAN 
countries
E
va
lu
at
io
n • Transport policy and administra-
tive management as the 2nd larg-
est sector committed
• The policy is part of soft infra-
structure –playing significant 
role in customs clearance issue 
and trade regulation.
• Negative perception on the 
country’s red tape bureaucracy 
and protectionist trade policy - 
resulted from unsound policy 
a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
management.
• Technical assistance is offered to 
policy makers in order to create a 
conducive and investor-friendly 
policy
• Committed bilateral and multi-
lateral committed AfT into 
trade policy sector
• Most of the logistics gridlocks: 
delivering industrial products to 
outer and remote islands outside 
Java
• Triggering price gaps between 
Java and the other outer 
islands
• Loosing competitiveness to 
neighboring countries
• AfT scheme is suggested to deliv-
ering aid towards more needed 
sectors and areas, such as exten-
sive and high quality air and wa-
ter transportation
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• Lower: the Philippines (57)
• Higher: Vietnam (48), Thailand 
(35), Malaysia (25) and 
Singapore (5)
• Past performance:  43 (of 150) in 
2007, 75 (of 155) in 2010 and 59 
(of 155) in 2012
• Unstable performance indicates 
complexity in the country’s logis-
tics system
On the country’s logistics 
system
• Agreed common platform: the 
Blueprint on National Logistics 
System or SISLOGNAS (Sistem 
Logistik Nasional) governed un-
der Presidential Regulation No. 
26 March 2012
• Key commodities: primary and 
strategic commodity; export ori-
ented product; and general 
product
• Assessments on key commodities, 
logistics players (LPs) and service 
providers (LSPs), and supporting 
systems (SISLOGNAS 2014)
• On supporting systems
• Transport infrastructure: in-
ternational hub seaports, air-
ports, scheduled short sea 
shipping (SSS)
• ICT infrastructure: national 
e-logistics system (INALOG)
• Human resource management: 
synchronized laws & regula-
tions, initiation of SISLOGNAS 
task force
• As the least AfT committed sec-
tor, ICT should be contributing 
factor to drive logistics system 
more efficiently and to provide 
fast and reliable service for both 
exporters and importers
• The sector got a mere 1% share 
of the total AfT commitment 
(valued US $ 19.952 millions).
• Other sector directly linked to 
ICT is telecommunications 
which also had a very small 
share (less then 1% and valued 
only US $ 4 millions of the total 
AfT committed).
• Indonesia National Single 
Window (INSW) as an ICT-
related trade facilitation 
initiative
• INSW enables international 
(cross-border) traders to submit 
regulatory documents at a sin-
gle location and/or single 
entity
• Typical documents to be cov-
ered under INSW: customs 
declarations, applications for 
import/export permits, and 
other supporting documents 
(certificates of origin and trad-
ing invoices).
• ICT development is mandatory in 
managing and handling those 
complex procedural and adminis-
trative paper works and facilitat-
ing other trade matters.
 The framework offers a stylized and compact analytical description on how the 
linkages of AfT and TF should be best used in addressing the country’s underper-
formed AfT and TF schemes and practices, and hence hopefully also to manage 
(and deal with) its logistics complexities. The following notes intend to provide a 
non-exhaustive assessment list that is derived from the integrated framework 
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previously elaborated.
 The “first things first” point to be made is that there is little evidence of bold 
and clear guidance from relevant governmental authorities on how the current AfT 
scheme should be aimed at and administered by, i.e. in the midst of its abundant 
potential in terms of facilitating trade. Similarly, there has not been adequate 
guidance on how the existing TF practices should be conducted coherently, i.e. to 
cover TF areas systematically and comprehensively. Conversely, the current state 
of play with regards to enforcement and full implementation of TFA should be 
managed shows no adequate progression, i.e. especially in terms of targeted specific 
goals and objectives, resources needed, roadmaps and timeframe towards step-by-
step procedures of notification of TFA commitment. Concerted actions among rele-
vant trade stakeholders should hence be initiated and designed under an integrated 
AfT and TF framework and in light of provisions outlined in TFA.
 On the existing AfT scheme, there is a concern over the government capability 
to create a “one-roof” system of foreign aid disbursement mechanism. From the 
government point of view, it is a mechanism that could directly identify and appoint 
which agency/ministry/SOE/local government is in need for which particular aid/
AfT/TF is critically desired. The mechanism could be materialized by closer and 
detailed collaboration between MoF, BAPPENAS and the Indonesian Coordinating 
Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA). Those 3 (three) ministries need to set up 
and appoint “1st-echelon level representative” roundtable which meet up, discuss 
and make decisions on a regular basis. Should proper and sound mechanism of 
foreign aid disbursement be entirely set up, decision making and policy formulation 
over AfT/TF-related projects and programs could focus on assuring that implemen-
tation of projects and its expenditures are conducted by the right agencies/institu-
tions on their proper needs.
 Under the current implementation of decentralization policy in Indonesia, 
however, best option is to appoint BAPPENAS as a single institution that has a 
legal right to coordinate the flow of foreign aid nation-wide, including that of AfT 
and TF scheme. Among the three ministries previously mentioned, BAPPENAS is 
the only agency that has an “arms-length” representative at the regional and local 
levels. As a legacy of the Orde Baru (New Order) administrative system, Agency for 
Development Planning at Local/Regional level or BAPPEDA (stands for Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah in Bahasa Indonesia) is a suitable counterpart 
of BAPPENAS at local/regional levels. BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA has long history 
of collaborations in terms of data and information sharing, joint works on develop-
ment planning and co-trainings and research, etc. 
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 In order to improve the implementation and monitoring systems of aid dis-
bursement, the government should make a target and evaluation scheme based on 
each agreement with respective donor. Best practices by international donor 
agencies offer elaborate procedures and techniques of monitoring and implementa-
tion evaluation of aid disbursement. An integrated AfT and TF disbursement 
scheme could therefore emulate the schemes suggested by major aid donor agencies 
in the country, such as the World Bank and JICA (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency)15.
 INSW (Indonesia National Single Window) initiative alone can not certainly be 
treated as an all-inclusive solution to ensure improvement of the country’s logistics 
system. Further TF arrangement is required in order the government to be much 
bolder and decisive in implementing the initiative. The Indonesian government 
should acquire advance IT system in order to integrate export and import docu-
ments from port and airport considering that INSW is an initial stage towards the 
next transformation into National Single Gateway system which focuses on merg-
ing the export-import and investment clearance. 
 Leaner bureaucracy is indeed a prerequisite by which local exporters could 
easily access the global markets and by which they could increase quality of their 
export commodity. Leaner bureaucracy assures achievement of world-class local 
service providers and of holding a certified training agency for better and advanced 
local logistics expertise. Finally, a shared common mission and vision among rele-
vant stakeholders is a must in order to strengthen Indonesia’s national logistics 
system. Opportunities to compete, collaborate and jointly operate with foreign lo-
gistics service providers could only achieved under a shared platform among logis-
tics stakeholders. The government should hence persistently revitalize the 
Presidential Decree No. 26/2011 of SISLOGNAS Blue Print and through which 
create more working bodies responsible to execute renewed programs of national 
logistics system based on the blue print and government’s RPJMN and RPJP.
 
Concluding Remarks
 Despite some improvements in its logistics performance, Indonesia’s position 
as compared to other major ASEAN countries and the BRICs is lagging behind. As 
the fifth largest recipient country for AfT, the country shall be able to utilize the 
15. Detailed comparison between the two agencies is presented in the report of the study to 
which the article is referred (Annex 1-Research Report 2015 WTO Chairs Programme Annual 
Report 2015, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia).
———————————————————
105
Towards an Integrated Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation Framework: Logistics Management Reform in Indonesia
scheme to improve its logistics performance. As previously shown, road, railroads 
and water transport infrastructure and transport policy and administrative man-
agement are main areas which become the focus of Indonesia’s AfT commitment. 
The largest aid committed by the donors flows and disbursed into transport infra-
structure sectors, especially road and railway transportation networks. Given such 
a feature, AfT should have contributed to an improved logistics system. Other sec-
tors such as trade policy and administrative management should also have sup-
ported efforts to improve the country’s logistics performance. 
 Nevertheless, the underlying AfT-TF scheme formulated and currently imple-
mented in the country has a substantial effect in properly mapping out the overall 
needs and planning of the country’s logistics system. As the aforementioned policy 
notes suggest, it deals not only with governmental institutional problems (where 
coordination among various levels authorities is lacking), but also with much 
broader complexities with regards to lack of shared common understanding and 
platform among relevant logistics stakeholders on how the complexities should be 
dealt with and, particularly, on how AfT-TF scheme fits to their improvement 
needs.
 Last but not least, this specific case on Indonesian logistics have confirmed 
significant roles of AfT and TF scheme amidst complexities in its formulation and 
implementation. For the country’s trade and logistics stakeholders, the country’s 
compliance to obligations under the TF Agreement is something worth to note and 
draw lessons from. Integrating AfT and TF scheme is therefore a strategic policy 
option for a country like Indonesia who is pursuing advanced facilitations of trade 
and at the same time who is aspring for strengthened and improved logistics 
competitiveness.
 
Reference
Arvis, Jean Francois et al. 2014. Connecting to Complete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy. 
World Bank, Washington DC
Bahagia, Senator Nur, et al. 2013. State of Logistics Indonesia (SLI) 2013. World Bank Indonesia, 
Jakarta
Baldwin, R. 2011. "Trade and Industrialisation after Globalisation’s 2nd Unbundling: How 
Building and Joining a Supply Chain are Different and Why It Matters" NBER Working 
Papers 17716, National Bureau of Economic Research
Banomyong, R. 2008. “Logistics Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-region: A Study of the 
North-South Economic Corridor”. Journal of Greater Mekong Sub-region Development 
Studies. Vol. 4 (44)
Basnett, Y., et al. 2012. “Increasing the Effectiveness of Aid for Trade: the Circumstances under 
which It Works Best’, ODI Working Paper 353, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 
106
Riza Noer ARFANI & Poppy S. WINANTI
London, avalaible on-line at: www.odi.org.uk/publications/6771-increasing-effectiveness-aid 
-trade
Blyde, Juan, Danielken Molina. 2012. Logistics Infrastructure and the International Location of 
Fragmented Production. Inter-American Development Bank
Desouza, R., Goh, M., Gupta, S., and Lei, L. 2007. An Investigation into the Measures Affecting the 
Integration of ASEAN’s Priority Sectors (Phase 2): The Case of Logistics. Jakarta: ASEAN 
Australia Development Cooperation Program
Feenstra, R.C. 1998. “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global 
Economy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 12 (4)
Gattorna JL, DW Walters. 1996. Managing the Supply Chain: a Strategic Perspective. London: 
McMillan Press Ltd.
Government of Indonesia, Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS). 2015. 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Infrastructure Project Plans in Indonesia 2015.
Helble, Matthias, Catherine L. Mann, John S. Wilson. 2012. “Aid for Trade Facilitation.” Review 
of World Economy (2012) 148:357–376 (DOI 10.1007/s10290-011-0115-9)
Hummels, D. 2001. “Time as a Trade Barrier.” available on-line at: www.krannert.purdue.edu/
faculty/hummelsd/research/time3b.pdf
Jacobs, Wouter. 2012. “The Role of Port Infrastructure and Logistics in Global Networks” Global 
Journal of Research Analysis 
Jose, Tongzon. 1990. “Determinants of Competitiveness in Logistics: Implications for the Region”, 
Paper, International Conference on Competitiveness: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Asian Countries, Singapore
Laird, S. 2007. “Aid for Trade: Cool Aid or Kool-Aid?” G-24 Discussion Paper No. 48, Geneva: 
UNCTAD
Limao, N. and A. J. Venables. 2002. "Geographical Disadvantage: a Heckscher-Ohlin-von Thunen 
Model of International Specialization”. Journal of International Economics. Elsevier, vol. 58 
(2)
Lombaerde, Philippe de and Lakshmi, Puri. eds. 2008. AfT: Global and Regional Perspectives, 2nd 
edition, Springer, Brugge-Belgium
Marc, Proksch and Noordin Azhari. 2007. “AFT and Public-Private Partnerships in the Asian and 
Pacific Region”, in Philippe De Lombaerde, ed. AFT: Global and Regional Perspectives, 2nd 
edition, Springer, Brugge-Belgium
OECD. 2013. “Trade Facilitation Indicators: the Potential Impact of Trade Facilitation.” Trade 
Policy Paper
OECD. 2015. “Trade Facilitation Indicators: An Overview of Available Tools.” OECD Trade and 
Agriculture Directorate
OECD-WTO. 2013a. “AfT and Value Chains in Transport and Logistics.” OECD-WTO Report. 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/AidforTrade_SectorStudy_Transport.pdf 
OECD-WTO. 2013b. “Chapter 5: Evaluating the Efefctiveness of Aid for Trade” in OECD-WTO. 
Aid for Trade at a Glance 2013: Connecting to Value Chains. Geneva: WTO  https://www.
wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade13_chap5_e.pdf 
OECD-WTO. 2015. Aid for Trade at a Glance 2015: Reducing Trade Costs for Inclusive, 
Sustainable Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris, available on-line at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
aid_glance-2015-en
OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics. 2016. Available on-line at: http://
stats.oecd.org/qwids
Shepherd, B. 2013. In OECD-WTO AfT and Value Chains in Transport and Logistics.
Snieska, V. and Simkunaite, I. 2009. Socio-economic Impact of Infrastructure Investments. 
Inzinerine Ekonomika-Engineering Economics.
Suwa-Eisenmann, A. and T. Verdier. 2007. “Aid and Trade” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23 
107
Towards an Integrated Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation Framework: Logistics Management Reform in Indonesia
(3), 481-507
UNCTAD. 2003. Efiicient Transport and Trade Facilitation to Improve Participation by 
Developing Countries in International Trade”. UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva
World Bank. 2007. Connecting to Compete Trade Logistic in The Global Economy: the Logistics 
Performance Index and Its Indicators, Washington DC: The World Bank.
World Bank. 2010. The Logistics Performance Index and Its Indicators. Connecting to Compete: 
Trade Logistics in The Global Economy
World Bank. 2010. “The Logistics Performance Index and Its Indicators. Connecting to Compete: 
Trade Logistics in The Global Economy.World Bank Group. Washington DC
World Economic Forum. 2014. The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015. Geneva.
WTO. 2006. ‘Recommendations of the Task Force on AFT WT/AFT/1’, WTO, Geneva

